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Abstract 
It seems self-evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable 
experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this 
preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which 
people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic 
experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such 
preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future pain or 
pleasure. We find consistent evidence that, all else being equal, adults and children aged 7 
and over prefer pleasure to lie in the future and pain in the past and believe that other people 
will too. They also predict that other people will be happier when pleasure is in the future 
rather than the past but sadder when pain is the future rather than the past. Younger children 
have the same temporal preferences as adults for their own painful experiences, but prefer 
their pleasure to lie in the past, and GRQRWSUHGLFWWKDWRWKHUV¶OHYHOVRIKDSSLQHVVRUVDGQHVV
vary dependent on whether experiences lie in the past or the future.  However, from the age 
of 7, temporal preferences were typically abandoned at the earliest opportunity when the 
quantity of past pain or pleasure was greater than the quantity located in the future. Past-
future preferences for hedonic goods emerge early developmentally but are surprisingly 
flexible.  
 
Keywords: temporal; time; development; hedonic; preferences 
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1. Introduction 
Imagine being in hospital for painful surgery. You need to be awake during this 
surgery, so anesthetics are not possible, but patients are given a post-operative drug that 
causes them to forget the last few hours. You wake up in hospital, unsure of whether you 
have yet had the operation, and ask for information. The nurse cannot remember whether you 
are the patient who had the operation yesterday, in which case it lasted 10 hours, or the 
patient who will have the operation tomorrow, in which case it will last 1 hour. The nurse 
goes WRILQGRXW:KDWZRXOG\RXKRSHWKHQXUVH¶VDQVZer will be? The philosopher Derek 
Parfit (1984), who proposed this thought experiment, claims that people will prefer to be the 
patient who had the 10-hour painful operation yesterday rather than the one who will have the 
1-hour painful operation tomorrow. 3HRSOH¶VSUHIHUHQFHIRUXQSOHDVDQWH[SHULHQFHVWROLHLQ
the past and, conversely, for pleasant experiences to lie in the future has been described as a 
temporal bias (Hare, 2007; Sullivan, 2018).  
1.1 Past-future Hedonic Preferences 
 We will refer to a preference over whether a pleasant or unpleasant experience is in 
the past or future as a µpast-future hedonic preference¶. There is already a lively debate about 
the origins and significance of past-future hedonic preferences in philosophy (e.g., 
Dougherty, 2015; Fernandes, forthcoming; Sullivan, 2018; Tarsney, 2017), where it has been 
taken as self-evident that people exhibit them. The SXUSRVHRI3DUILW¶VWKRXJKWH[SHULPHQWLV
to demonstrate not just temporal bias, but the idea that the bias is so strong that there is a 
preference for considerably worse things in the past over less bad things in the future. Such 
preferences can be seen as analogous in some respect to preferences involving the temporal 
locations of rewards in the future (e.g., Berns, Laibson, & Loewenstein, 2007; Loewenstein, 
Read, & Baumeister, 2003). 3HRSOH¶V preferences for a smaller more immediate reward over a 
larger one a greater distance in the future have been studied extensively, and indicate that the 
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value of a future reward is discounted as some function of its distance away in time. 
Similarly, it has been suggested that the extent to which individuals have preferences 
regarding the past versus future locations of pleasant or unpleasant experiences can be 
thought of in terms of the degree to which past experiences are discounted (Suhler & 
Callender, 2012; Sullivan, 2018).  
 Sullivan (2018, p.58) has argued WKDW³,QWKHFDVHRI³SXUH´H[SHULHQFHVRISDLQVDQG
pleasures, it seems that our discount functions are absolute: for any amount of time that has 
elapsed, we assign no value to a merely past painful experience or pleasuUDEOHH[SHULHQFH´ 
However, studies of inter-temporal choice tasks involving monetary rewards at various 
distances in the past indicate that the value of such rewards declines systematically as a 
function of elapsed time (e.g., Bickel, Yi, Kowal, & Gatchalian, 2008; Yi, Gatchalian, & 
Bickel, 2006). Although these studies examined monetary rewards rather than purely hedonic 
goods, it is at least plausible that similar discount functions might indeed obtain for the latter 
type of reward.  
 Several studies have suggested that future events are more valued and evoke more 
emotion than past events. Caruso, Gilbert, and Wilson (2008) demonstrated that people 
allocate more compensation for hypothetical tasks that lie in their future than for equivalent 
tasks that they have already performed, and report stronger emotions when contemplating 
imagined future versus imagined past events (Caruso, 2010; Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007). 
Even children show these patterns of judgments (Burns et al., 2019), which have been 
referred to as temporal asymmetries in value or in emotion judgments.  
In these previous studies, though, participants were not asked to choose whether they 
would prefer a pleasant or unpleasant experience to be in the past or the future (i.e., they were 
not making an inter-temporal choice). Rather, they had to assign values either to past or to 
future events. One reason for doubting that these studies allow us to straightforwardly draw 
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conclusions about past-future hedonic preferences stems from pDUWLFLSDQWV¶ own attitudes 
towards judgment patterns. Temporal asymmetries in value judgments are only observed 
when separate groups of participants make judgments about the value of past events and 
future events; when participants were asked to give values for both past and future events 
simultaneously, they assigned equal values to them (Caruso et al., 2008). This suggests that 
people believe assigning equal monetary value to past and future events to be normatively 
correct. By contrast, it is typically assumed that people believe past-future hedonic 
preferences are rational: Hare (2013, p. 519) argues that ³:HDUHDOOIXWXUHELDVHGZLWK
respect to our own bad experiences [and] it seems to us that it makes sense WREHELDVHG´
Thus, conclusions about past-future hedonic preferences cannot be drawn from the findings 
of existing studies that have examined the monetary values independently assigned to past 
versus future events. What is required is to study past-future hedonic preferences and the 
parameters governing such preferences directly.  
As far as we are aware, only one published empirical study has done so. Greene, 
Latham, Miller, and Norton (2020) presented adults with one future and one past event, 
manipulating its nature (hedonic or non-hedonic), valence (positive or negative), and whether 
it was said to happen in the life of the participant, or in the life of a stranger (first- or third-
person). They found that adults demonstrated past-future hedonic preferences for both 
pleasurable and painful hedonic events, regardless of whether they were said to be 
experienced by the participant or by someone else, although the past-future preferences for 
non-hedonic events were less clear-cut. *UHHQHHWDO¶VUHVXOWVSURYLGHVRPH initial 
compelling evidence that adults do indeed have past-future preferences regarding positive 
and negative hedonic events. However, their study involved a single vignette concerning a 
very speciILFHYHQWIDUUHPRYHGIURPSHRSOH¶VHYHU\GD\H[SHULHQFH (an astronaut awaking 
from a dream during a 10-year voyage from Earth). The contrived nature of the vignette was 
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driven by WKHVHUHVHDUFKHUV¶ concern to HQVXUHWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶MXGJPHQWVZHUHQRWDIfected 
as a result of imagining that they could intervene (e.g.) to prevent a future negative 
experience. While there are advantages in using a complex scenario that limits the extent to 
ZKLFKSDUWLFLSDQWV¶MXGJPHQWVPLJKWEHDIIHFWHGLQWKLVZD\DGLVDGYantage is that it is not 
clear how generalizable the findings are, or how they align with findings from studies 
addressing other types of intertemporal choice.  In the current study, we focus on everyday 
pains and pleasures and we address additional questions concerning the absolute nature of 
discounting of the past as well as the developmental origins of past-future preferences. 
1.2 Measuring Past-Future Hedonic Preferences 
Our experiments described below initially explored whether past-future hedonic 
preferences really are as ubiquitous as typically assumed, by eliciting preferences for simple 
experiences such as eating delicious food or getting a painful injection. We then examined 
the strength of any temporal bias, by establishing whether there is a trade-off point at which 
participants will switch their preferences. If preferences are absolute (Sullivan, 2018), then 
participants should demonstrate them regardless of the duration or intensity of the 
experiences. 3DUILW¶VWKRXJKWH[SHULPHQWLVsupposed to demonstrate that this is the case by 
showing that people would prefer 10 hours of past pain over 1 hour of future pain. However, 
not only is this merely a thought experiment, but it hinges on the unusual assumption that the 
person making the choice has permanent amnesia about the relevant past events. It has been 
argued that assuming such amnesia is crucial in this contextEHFDXVHLWHQVXUHVWKDWSHRSOH¶V
choices are affected solely by the temporal location of the experience in question and not 
also, say, by the presently occurring memories of past pain (Sullivan, 2018). However, it is 
difficult to see how H[DFWO\PHPRULHVRISDVWSDLQPLJKWPDVNSHRSOH¶VWHPSRUDO preferences.  
On the assumption that such memories of past pain are themselves painful, one might 
expect people to prefer a situation in which they are without such memories, and hence a 
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situation in which the pain has not yet occurred, masking a purely temporal preference for 
pain to be in the past. Thus, although it is true that the possibility of presently-experienced 
memories thus introduces a potential confound, it is not clear that this can be used to argue 
that past-future differences in judgements might fail to track genuine past-future hedonic 
preferences. Conversely, the assumption of amnesia, too, introduces a confound of a related 
NLQG,IWKHSDWLHQWLQ3DUILW¶VVWRU\ILQGVRXWWKDWWKH\KDYHDOUHDG\KDGWKHRSHUDWLRQWKLVDW
the same time, serves as confirmation that the amnesia-inducing drug has worked and that 
they will not have to live with the memories of their operation, whereas they do not already 
have similar assurances with respect to an operation to be carried out in the future. Thus, if in 
3DUILW¶s scenario people express a preference for the situation in which the operation has 
already occurred, this too could be due to factors other than purely temporal ones. At any 
rate, we note that past-future hedonic preferences have been taken to be of interest precisely 
because they are believed to be both ubiquitous and strong (Suhler & Callender, 2013); this 
means it should be possible to observe such preferences even if they cannot be studied in 
complete isolation from other factors. Indeed, in Greene et DO¶VVWXG\although they 
used a contrived scenario, it was not one involving permanent total amnesia (rather, the 
character is momentarily confused having woken from a dream), and they nevertheless found 
clear past-future preferences. In the current study we used even simpler scenarios on the 
assumption that if past-future hedonic preferences are robust, straightforward cases that do 
not involve forgetting should also be able to provide evidence for them.  
 In fact, such preferences are assumed to be sufficiently pervasive that some theorists 
have suggested they should be explained in evolutionary terms (Maclaurin & Dyke, 2002; 
Suhler & Callender, 2013), and as a manifestation of a more general tendency to care more 
about the future than about the past. On this view, this pattern of preferences derives from 
more a fundamental past-future asymmetry of control: while people can act on and in some 
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sense control aspects of the future, they cannot control the past, and it is therefore usually 
adaptive to care more about the future than the past (Caruso, 2010; Maclaurin & Dyke, 2002; 
Suhler & Callender, 2012; Sullivan, 2018). Thus, past-future hedonic preferences are 
assumed to be just one example of an adaptive tendency to be future-oriented. 
1.3 Developmental Considerations 
Claims about the origins of past-future preferences raise interesting developmental 
issues. If past-future hedonic preferences are indeed a manifestation of an inbuilt adaptive 
tendency, we might expect to see them emerge relatively early in development. However, it is 
not clear that children of all ages will indeed show the same preferences as adults. In the most 
relevant developmental study to date, Burns et al. (2019) found evidence that temporal 
asymmetries in other types of judgments have a developmental profile: 4- to 5-year-olds 
judged that events in the future felt closer than those an equivalent distance in the past, but it 
was not until children were aged 6-7 that they reported feeling stronger emotions when 
thinking about the future versus the past, and not until 9-10 years that children appeared to 
accord greater value to future than past events.  
Although Burns et al. (2019) provide evidence regarding the developmental profile of 
a variety of temporal asymmetries in judgments, the relevant developmental mechanisms for 
these changes are poorly understood. There is, though, good evidence that there are 
substantial changes in chiOGUHQ¶V temporal cognition. Preschool children use tensed language 
appropriately (Harner, 1976; Weist, Wysocka, & Lyytinen, 1991) and are able to episodically 
remember the past and imagine the future (Coughlin, Lyons, & Ghetti, 2014; Hayne, Gross, 
McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011). However, children of this age are just starting to get 
to grips with the way events are ordered in time (Friedman, 2005; Hoerl & McCormack, 
2019), and with the causal significance DQHYHQW¶VEHLQJ located in the past versus the future 
has for the present (Grant & Suddendorf, 2010; Zhang & Hudson, 2018). Preschoolers 
PAST-FUTURE PREFERENCES FOR HEDONIC GOODS 
 9 
frequently make errors when locating and ordering events within time, particularly when 
reasoning about future, as opposed to past events (McColgan & McCormack, 2008; 
McCormack & Hanley, 2011), and the ability to think hypothetically about the future and 
counterfactually about the past continues to develop in important ways into middle childhood 
(Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010). 
There are further substantial developmental improvements into adolescence in the ability to 
imagine past and future personal experiences (Abram, Picard, Navarro, & Piolino, 2014; Gott 
& Lah, 2014) and to locate and order events in time (Friedman, 1989, 2005). Taken together, 
this evidence suggests that we cannot be confident that children of all ages will show the 
same sort of temporal preferences regarding hedonic experiences as more mature thinkers. If 
indeed such preferences are strong and ubiquitous in adults but not in children, it would 
constitute a very striking developmental difference.  
1.4 The Current Study 
 In Experiments 1a-c, adults and children were asked about simple temporal 
preferences for painful and pleasurable hedonic experiences when those experiences were of 
equal intensity. We framed the task as one in which participants had to judge whether they 
would prefer to be someone who had already experienced (e.g.) a painful injection, or 
someone who was going to experience such an injection in the future. We also elicited 
judgments about whether greater happiness or unhappiness is associated with past versus 
future pain/pleasure; for example, participants were asked to judge who would be more 
unhappy: someone who had already had a painful injection or someone who had yet to 
experience it. This allowed us to examine the extent to which participants also showed 
patterns of emotion prediction that were consistent with any past-future hedonic preferences 
that they demonstrated. 2Q6XKOHUDQG&DOOHQGHU¶VHYROXWLRQDU\DFFRXQW of such 
preferences, differential strengths of emotions produced when thinking about the past and 
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future play a key role in explaining temporally asymmetric patterns of judgments. 
Specifically, the idea is that people experience stronger emotions when thinking about future 
versus past events, and it is these stronger emotions that explain why, for example, people 
assign greater value to future than past events (see also Caruso, 2010; Caruso et al., 2008). 
Our emotion prediction task examined whether adults and children do indeed predict the 
strength of emotions associated with hedonic experiences to vary dependent on whether those 
experiences are in the past or future.  
In Experiments 2 and 3, we then investigated whether people preferred to switch their 
preferences when the amount of past pain or past pleasure on offer exceeded that located in 
the future, and, if so, what difference in magnitude of past versus future pain/pleasure would 
elicit such a switch. In those two experiments, we also asked what another person would 
prefer. This allowed us to examine the extent to which people assume the pattern of 
preferences they hold themselves is indeed universal. Hare (2013) claimed that people 
believe it simply makes sense to have past-future hedonic preferences; if this is correct, we 
might e[SHFWWRVHHQRGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶RZQSUHIHUHQFHVDQGWKRVHthey 
expect another person to have. Alternatively, it could be WKDWFRQVLGHULQJDQRWKHU¶V
perspective rather than RQH¶VRZQreduces the level of affect and sense of proximity 
associated with the future experience, potentially reducing temporal bias (Caruso et al., 2008; 
Greene & Sullivan, 2015; Hare, 2013). Indeed, Greene et al. (2020) found that past-future 
hedonic preferences were lHVVPDUNHGZKHQSDUWLFLSDQWVFRQVLGHUHGDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶V
perspective. 
2. Experiment 1a 
Experiments 1a (adults) and 1b (children) examined past-future hedonic preferences 
for a set of unpleasant and a set of pleasurable experiences. The design and procedure for the 
experiments were very similar, differing primarily in terms of the specific unpleasant and 
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pleasurable experiences used with each sample. Given their similarity, the results for 
Experiments 1a and 1b are reported together. In both experiments, there was an initial check 
to ensure that the experiences in question did indeed have the appropriate hedonic values to 
participants.  
2.1 Method 
  2.1.1 Participants. Thirty-nine adults (M = 26.86 years, SD = 8.74, range: 18±62 
years, 9 males) participated in the experiment at WKHILUVWDXWKRU¶VXQLYHUVLW\. Participants 
were recruited by offering voluntary participation immediately after university classes and 
received no compensation. The study was completed in various quiet spaces at the 
university. Ethical approval for this and all other experiments was received from the 
research ethics committee of 4XHHQ¶V8QLYHUVLW\%HOIDVWprotocol number EPS 18_19. 
2.1.2 Design, materials and procedure. Participants completed four trials: two 
Temporal Preference trials and two Emotion Prediction trials, in each case one about pain 
and one about pleasure. Trials of the same type (Temporal Preference or Emotion 
Prediction) were always encountered consecutively. The order of presentation of trials of 
the same type was counterbalanced, as were the order of presentation of questions about 
pleasure and about pain and the type of trial associated with each specific painful or 
pleasurable experience. The experiment comprised an initial Hedonic Value Check during 
which participants evaluated the relevant experiences, and then the past-future task with the 
Temporal Preference and Emotion Prediction trials.  
2.1.3 Hedonic Value Check. Participants rated the pleasantness or otherwise of 4 
experiences on a 7-point visual Likert scale, labeled from 1 (Extremely unpleasant) to 7 
(Extremely pleasant) and using red thumbs-down and green thumbs-up pictures of varying 
sizes (Fig. 1). The two painful experiences were having a painful injection and having a 
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painful dental procedure. The two pleasurable experiences were eating a free meal at an 
excellent restaurant aQGZDWFKLQJRQH¶VIDYRULWHFRPHGLDQSHUIRUPOLYH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Depictions of events used during the Hedonic Value Check with child (above) and 
adult (below) participants in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c, alongside the visual rating scale 
used with both child and adult participants. Stimuli depict the events described during the 
subsequent temporal preference and emotion prediction trials. 
 
2.1.4 Temporal Preference Trials. Each trial involved two line drawings of faces 
with a neutral expression: females saw female faces, and males saw male faces. A short piece 
of written text introduced the characters, stating that one of them experienced an event 
yesterday, although s/he is not experiencing it now, and that the other will experience the 
event tomorrow, although s/he is not experiencing it now. Event descriptions referred to the 
events introduced during the Hedonic Value Check. For instance, on a trial about the painful 
injection, the text was ³This is Annie, and this is Betty. Both of them are fine now ± they 
GRQ¶WKDYHDQ\SDLQ$QQLHKDGDSDLQIXOLQMHFWLRQ\HVWHUGD\DOWKRXJKVKHLVQRWLQSDLQ
today. Betty will have a painful injection tomorrow, although she is not in pain today.´ 
Participants then responded to the preference question ± ³Who would you rather be? Annie, 
who had a painful injection yesterday, or Betty, who will havHDSDLQIXOLQMHFWLRQWRPRUURZ"´
± by checking a box. Participants ZHUHWKHQDVNHGµ:K\ZRXOG\RXUDWKHUEHWKDWSHUVRQ"¶
and given two printed lines on which to give a free-text response.  
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2.1.5 Emotion Prediction Trials. These trials paralleled the design of the Temporal 
Preference trials, except that rather than being asked about their own preference (who they 
would rather be), participants ZHUHDVNHGDERXWWKHWZRFKDUDFWHUV¶FXUUHQWHPRWLRQDl state. 
For pleasurable experiences, participants were asked µ:KRLVPRUHKDSS\ULJKWQRZ"¶DQGIRU
painful experiences, they were asked µ:KRLVPRUHXQKDSS\ULJKWQRZ"¶  
2.1.6 Data Scoring and Analysis. 3DUWLFLSDQWV¶ choices on the Hedonic Value Check 
task were assigned a score from -3 (lowest point on the 7-point scale) through 3 (highest 
point on the scale). Choosing the midpoint resulted in a score of 0. On rare occasions when a 
score of 0 or lower was given for a pleasurable experience or 0 or higher for an unpleasant 
experience, only the trial involving that experience was dropped, and other data from the 
same participant was retained; this yielded slightly different ns across trials for the analyses 
below. Pain ratings were multiplied by -1 prior to analysis, such that all scores reflected only 
WKHGHJUHHDQGQRWWKHYDOHQFHRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶OLNLQJRUGLVOLNHIRUWKHSDLQIXODQG
SOHDVXUDEOHH[SHULHQFHVZLWKZKLFKWKH\ZHUHSUHVHQWHG3DUWLFLSDQWV¶FKRLFHVRQWKH 
Temporal Preference task were assigned a score of 1 if their preference was for the expected 
temporal location (future for pleasure; past for pain), and a score of 0 if they displayed the 
opposite preference (past for pleasure; future for pain). Similarly, their judgments on the 
Emotion Prediction trials were scored 1 if their prediction was in the expected temporal 
location, and 0 if they displayed the opposite judgment.  
3. Experiment 1b 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants. One hundred and sixteen children (48 males) between the ages of 
4 and 11 ZHUHUHFUXLWHGIURPVFKRROVORFDOWRWKHOHDGDXWKRU¶VLQVWLWXWLRQ7KHVDPSOHZDV
split by age: 36 4±5-year-olds (M = 63.53 months, SD = 2.77, range: 58±71 months), 32 7±8-
year-olds (M = 96.97 months, SD = 5.1, range: 89-105 months), 24 9±10-year-olds (M = 
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118.33 months, SD = 3.68, range: 112-125 months), and 24 10±11-year-olds (M = 131.96 
months, SD = 3.80, range: 126±138 months) participated. Testing took place in various quiet 
spaces within participating schools.   
3.1.2 Design, materials and procedure. The design of the study was identical to that 
of Experiment 1a. The materials and procedure were very similar, but there were some 
modifications to ensure the task was suitable for a child population. Rather than children 
completing a paper questionnaire, the task was administered by an experimenter and children 
gave verbal responses or pointed at their answers. The two painful experiences were a painful 
injection and taking medicine, and the two pleasurable experiences were eating cake and 
playing on a bouncy castle.  
During the Hedonic Value Check task, children were presented with colorful 
laminated pictures representing events and the same rating scale as the one that was used with 
adults (Fig. 1). The points on the scale were described as ranging from µreally, really not 
nice¶ to µreally, really nice¶. Children were then asked a series of questions to assess their 
understanding of the scale. If children responded incorrectly, the experimenter explained the 
scale a second time and repeated the questions. Children then used the scale to indicate how 
nice they found two pleasurable and two painful experiences: ³eating a delicious slice of 
cake´, ³playing on a fun bouncy castle´, ³taking some horrible-tasting medicine´, and 
³having a painful injection´.  
The Temporal Preference trials were identical to those used with adults, except that 
children pointed to or named the appropriate character in giving their answer. The procedure 
for Emotion Prediction trials was slightly different than that used with adults in order to 
ensure that children understood they were being asked to make relative emotion judgments: 
instead of judging who was happier or sadder, participants were asked to place a small 
laminated picture of a mouth onto one of two laminated line drawings of faces, each of which 
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featured a small piece of Velcro in place of the mouth. Children were first shown how to 
SODFHDQHXWUDOµQRW-happy not-VDG¶PRXWKRQWRRQHRIWKHSLFWXUHVDQGWULHGWKLV
themselves. The experimenter then revealed four more pictures of mouths, placing them in a 
vertical line between the two face pictures ³7KLVLVWKHYHU\KDSS\PRXWK7KLVLVWKHOLWWOH
ELWKDSS\PRXWK7KLVLVWKHOLWWOHELWVDGPRXWK$QGWKLVLVWKHYHU\VDGPRXWK´7KH
experimenter then turned over the two mouth pictures that would not be required for the 
current trial, leaving only two mouths visible to the child (little bit happy and very happy for 
Pleasure trials, and little bit sad and very sad for Pain trials). The experimenter asked (e.g.), 
³I want you to think about who is more sad right now? Emma who had a painful injection 
yesterday or Fiona who will have a painful injection tomorrow? Put the very sad mouth on 
the person who feels more sad right now and put the little bit sad mouth on the person who 
feels less sad right now.´ For both types of trials, children were asked to explain their 
answers and the experimenter noted their explanations.  
3.1.3 Data Scoring and Analysis. Data scoring and analysis was carried out in an 
identical manner to Experiment 1a.  
3.2 Results of Experiments 1a and b 
All analyses were performed separately on adult and child data. Tables S1 and S2 of 
the Supplemental Material (available online) report data for the Hedonic Value Check task. 
These ratings indicate that the experiences had the appropriate hedonic value.  
Results from the Temporal Preference and Emotion Prediction tasks are reported in 
Table 1, where they are shown as a proportion of participants who demonstrated temporal 
location judgments in the expected direction. The final column on the table gives the number 
(and %) of participants in each age group who provided a consistent response across 
Temporal Preference and Emotion Prediction tasks (i.e., consistently preferring the past or 
future events), separately for pleasant and unpleasant experiences. We first examined 
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SDUWLFLSDQWV¶WHPSRUDOlocation judgments against chance levels using 2-tailed binomial tests. 
Adults preferred pleasurable experiences to lie in the future and painful experiences to lie in 
the past at a rate above chance, and they also predicted that someone would be sadder with 
their pain in the future. However, DGXOWV¶judgments when deciding whether someone else 
whose pleasure lay in the past versus the future would be happier were only marginally 
significantly different from chance. Nine±to±ten and 10±11-year-olds preferred pleasurable 
experiences to lie in the future and painful experiences to lie in the past at a rate above 
chance, and they also predicted at a rate above chance that someone would be happier if their 
pleasure was in the future and sadder if their pain was in the future. Seven-to-eight-year-olds¶ 
pattern of performance was identical to that of the older children, except that judgments about 
whether someone would be sadder with their pain in the past or in the future were not 
significantly different from chance. Four±to±five-year-olds¶SUHIHUHQFHVIRUWKHWHPSRUDO
location of their own pain was at chance, and for their own pleasure, there was a trend 
towards a preference in the opposite direction to that expected: that is, towards a preference 
for their own pleasure to lie in the past. Four±to±five-year-olds also predicted at a rate above 
chance that someone would be happier if their pleasure was in the past than the future. Their 
judgments did not differ from chance regarding whether someone would be sadder if their 
pain was in the future or the past. 
7KHFRQVLVWHQF\RISDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVDFURVV7HPSRUDO3UHIHUHQFHDQG(PRWLRQ
Prediction trials varied with age group. The youngest group were highly inconsistent across 
the two judgment types, whereas for all the older groups consistency varied between 52% and 
100%.  
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Table 1 
Results of 2-tailed binomial tests against chance, Experiments 1a & b. Frequencies and 
percentages represent participants who demonstrated temporal location preferences in the 
expected direction. 
Age group, trial  Valence Frequency 
(%) 
95% CI p Consistent 
across trial 
type (%)a 
4-5 (N = 36)      
Pleasure Temporal Preference (n = 36) 12 (33%) 0.19, 0.50 .065 2 (5.71%) 
     Emotion prediction (n = 35) 8 (23%) 0.10, 0.40 .002# 
Pain Temporal Preference (n = 23) 13 (57%) 0.34, 0.77 .678 4 (11.43%) 
 Emotion prediction (n = 27) 10 (37%) 0.19, 0.58 .248 
7-8 (N = 32)      
Pleasure Temporal Preference (n = 30) 25 (83%) 0.65, 0.94 < .001 19 (67.86%) 
 Emotion prediction (n = 30) 25 (83%) 0.65, 0.94 < .001 
Pain Temporal Preference (n =28) 22 (79%) 0.59, 0.92 .004 13 (52%) 
 Emotion prediction (n = 27) 18 (67%) 0.46, 0.83 .122 
9-10 (N = 24)      
Pleasure Temporal Preference (n = 24) 20 (83%) 0.63, 0.95 .002 17 (70.83%) 
 Emotion prediction (n = 21) 19 (79%) 0.58, 0.93 .007 
Pain Temporal Preference (n = 19) 17 (89%) 0.67, 0.99 .001 13 (76.47%) 
     Emotion prediction (n = 18) 15 (75%) 0.51, 0.91 .041 
10-11 (N = 24)      
Pleasure Temporal Preference (n = 24) 24 (100%) 0.86, 1 < .001 17 (80.95%) 
 Emotion prediction (n = 21) 17 (81%) 0.58, 0.95 .007 
Pain Temporal Preference (n = 17) 16 (94%) 0.71, 1 < .001 13 (76.47%) 
 Emotion prediction (n = 18) 18 (100%) 0.81, 1 < .001 
Adults (N = 39)      
Pleasure Temporal Preference (n = 39) 36 (92%) 0.79, 0.98 < .001 24 (61.54%) 
 Emotion prediction (n = 39) 26 (67%) 0.50, 0.81 .053 
Pain Temporal Preference (n = 38) 38 (100%) 0.91, 1 < .001 36 (92.31%) 
 Emotion prediction (n = 37) 36 (97%) 0.86, 1 < .001 
Note. Participant numbers vary across trials because data from participants who did not report 
the appropriate hedonic value for a specific experience was removed on the relevant trial.  
a Percentages represent proportion of participants who completed both trial types. 
# Significantly different to chance in the direction opposite to that expected. 
 
To investigate the effect of valence (pain or pleasure) and, in the case of children, age 
group within trials of the same type (Temporal Preference trials and Emotion Prediction 
trials), we submitted the data to Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) analyses with 
binomial distributions, logit-log link functions and independent covariance structures. These 
analyses were selected to accommodate the binary nature of the dependent variable and the 
presence of a within-subject factor (valence) in the data.  
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No meaningful analysis was possible on the data from adults on Temporal Preference 
trials due to ceiling performance. We were able to H[DPLQHDGXOWV¶GDWDRQ Emotion 
Prediction trials, using valence as a predictor of judgment and rating on the Hedonic Value 
check task as a covariate. At the same levels of rating, there was a decrease in the odds of 
making a judgment in the expected direction when adults considered pleasure, rather than 
pain (Wald F2 (1) = 5.73, p = .017, b = -2.89, 95% CI [-5.26, -.52], SE = .1.20, Exp(B) = .055, 
95% CI [.06, .59]). 
We then examined cKLOGUHQ¶VGDWD for Temporal Preference trials, with valence, age 
group, and the interaction between valence and age group as predictors of judgment and 
rating on the Hedonic Value check task as a covariate. The model did not converge. The 
interaction was removed from the model. There was no effect of rating (p = .610) or valence 
(p = .292), but there was a significant effect of age group (Wald F2 (3) = 32.93, p < .001). In 
follow-up analyses, we first compared the youngest children (4±5-year-olds) with older 
children. At the same levels of rating, 7±8-year-olds (p <.001), 9±10-year-olds (p <.001), and 
10±11-year-olds (p <.001) all had higher odds of making a judgment in the expected direction 
than did 4±5-year-olds (7±8-year-olds: b = 1.72 , 95% CI [.82, 2.61], SE = .46 , Exp(B) = 
5.58, 95% CI [2.28, 13.65]); 9±10-year-olds: b = 2.18, 95% CI [1.14, 3.21], SE = .53, Exp(B) 
= 8.81 , 95% CI [3.12, 24.87]; 10±11-year-olds: b = 4.12, 95% CI [2.05, 6.19], SE = 1.06, 
Exp(B) = 61.59 , 95% CI [7.78, 487.58]). Further analyses revealed that there were no 
significant differences between any of the other age groups, except for 7-8-year-olds and 10±
11-year-olds (p = .026, b = -2.40, 95% CI [-4.52, -.29], SE = 1.08, Exp(B) = .09, 95% CI [.01, 
.75]).  
)LQDOO\ZHH[DPLQHGFKLOGUHQ¶VGDWDIRU(PRWLRQ3UHGLFWLRQ trials, with valence, age 
group, and the interaction between valence and age group as predictors of judgment and 
rating on the Hedonic Value check task as a covariate. The model did not converge. The 
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interaction was removed from the model. There was no effect of rating (p = .776) or valence 
(p = .984), but there was a significant effect of age group (Wald F2 (3) = 40.43, p < .001). 
Follow-up analyses showed that at the same levels of rating, 7±8-year-olds (p <.001), 9±10-
year-olds (p <.001), and 10±11-year-olds (p <.001) all had higher odds of making a judgment 
in the expected direction than did 4±5-year-olds (7±8-year-olds: (b = 2.15, 95% CI [1.26, 
3.03], SE = .45, Exp(B) = 8.55, 95% CI [3.52, 20.78]); 9±10-year-olds: b = 2.54, 95% CI 
[1.51, 3.58], SE = .53, Exp(B) = 12.72, 95% CI [4.51, 35.90]; 10±11-year-olds: b = 3.18, 95% 
CI [1.93, 4.42], SE = .63, Exp(B) = 23.96, 95% CI [6.91, 83.06]). There were no significant 
differences between any of the other groups.  
3.3 Discussion of Experiments 1a and 1b 
For all groups of participants apart from the 4±5-year-olds, the overall pattern of 
results on the Temporal Preference task ZDVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK3DUILW¶VFODLPWKDWSHRSOH
show a past-future preference for hedonic goods. Adults clearly preferred pain to lie in the 
past and pleasure to lie in the future and the majority of them thought that others would also 
be happier when this was the case. +RZHYHUZKHQSUHGLFWLQJRWKHUV¶HPRWLRQVWKH\ZHUH
significantly less likely to demonstrate a temporal bias when considering pleasure than pain. 
This finding may be at least in part explained by participants assuming a role for memory 
when predicting emotions but not when making temporal preference judgments. Both 
pleasant and painful memories are themselves pleasurable or painful, and can influence 
present emotional state, but to different degrees: by middle childhood (Rollins, Gibbons, & 
Cloude, 2018) and into adulthood (Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003), affect 
associated with pleasant events fades more slowly than affect associated with unpleasant 
events. Indeed, although we did not formally analyze the explanations given by participants, 
some of the DGXOWV¶ emotion predictions regarding past pleasures in particular seemed to 
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reflect an appreciation of the impact of memory on emotions (e.g., ³$QQLHFDQHQMR\WKH
memory and share her experience wiWKRWKHUVWRGD\´).  
Children as young as 7±8 years of age also demonstrated clear past-future hedonic 
preferences in the expected directions in the Temporal Preference task, although 7±8-year-
ROGV¶SHUIRUPDQFHZDV significantly less consistent than that of 10-11-year-olds, who 
performed very much like the adults. The striking age effects were between the youngest 
children and the other age groups. Four- to five-year-olds did not show the expected 
preferences for either type of hedonic experience and indeed showed a tendency to prefer 
their pleasure to be in the past. In the Emotion Prediction task, they did not predict that 
RWKHUV¶HPRWLRQVZRXOGEHDQ\GLIIHUHQWLQWKHFDVHRIIXWXUHWKDQRISDVWSDLQDQGLQIDFW
they predicted that someone would be happier with their pleasure in the past than in the 
future. We inspected the explanations of this age group for both tasks, but children struggled 
to give coherent explanations and those who said anything often either referred just to the 
enjoyable nature of the pleasurable experience or the mere fact that it occurred yesterday.   
Preschoolers are still learning to reason about the causal significance of whether an 
event is in the past or the future (Grant & Suddendorf, 2010; Zhang & Hudson, 2018) and 
getting to grips with locating and ordering events in time (Friedman, 1989; 2005; Hoerl & 
McCormack, 2019). Thus, the pattern of performance observed in this age group may reflect 
a genuine difference in the significance preschoolers attach to an experience being in the past 
versus the future. However, we had some concerns about aspects of the task procedure that 
younger children found challenging. One issue concerned the use of the temporal adverbs 
µ\HVWHUGD\¶DQGµWRPRUURZ¶, which not all preschoolers may understand (Tillman, Marghetis, 
Barner, & Srinivasan, 2017). Further issues concerned whether children remembered the 
information about WKHFKDUDFWHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVDQGXQGHUVWRRGWKHIRUPRIWKHWHVWTXHVWLRQ
PAST-FUTURE PREFERENCES FOR HEDONIC GOODS 
 21 
³:KRZRXOG\RXUDWKHUEH"´,QDIXUWKHUH[SHULPHQWZHUHSHDWHGWKHWDVNZLWK-5-year-olds 
with a modified procedure that addressed these concerns. 
4. Experiment 1c 
The task structure in Experiment 1c was similar to that used in Experiment 1b but it 
RPLWWHGWKHXVHRIWKHWHUPVµ\HVWHUGD\¶DQGµWRPRUURZ¶DQGincluded additional pre-training 
and a number of control questions WRFKHFNFKLOGUHQ¶Vmemory and understanding.  
4.1 Method 
Thirty-five 4± and 5±year-old children (M = 64.4 months, SD = 3.89 months, range: 
58±70 months, 17 males) were recruited from schools. Data from an additional 15 children 
were collected, but not used due to not answering questions (2 children), failing memory or 
comprehension checks (13 children, 3 of whom failed only memory checks, 4 of whom failed 
only a comprehension check, and 6 of whom failed both) and experimenter error (1 child).   
4.1.1 Materials. The rating scale for the Hedonic Value Check task and the pictures 
of protagonists used at test were identical to those used in Experiment 1b. The pictures of 
experiences were also identical, save for one change that made it plausible for all of the 
experiences to take place either early or late in the day: in place of eating a delicious piece of 
cake, protaJRQLVWVKDGHDWHQRUZRXOGHDWDµGHOLFLRXVGRQXW¶/DPLQDWHGSLFWXUHVRIDQ
additional pleasant event (having delicious ice-cream) and an additional unpleasant event 
KDYLQJDVRUHILQJHUZHUHXVHGWRFKHFNFKLOGUHQ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHTXHVWLRQ³Who 
would you rather be?´ Additional pictures of events encountered at regular times by children 
in the course of a typical weekday were used to sFDIIROGFKLOGUHQ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHWDVN
(an unmade bed, a backpack containing school equipment, a house, and a dinner plate: Fig. 
2). During two training trials, we presented children with additional pictures of people (Fig. 
2) and used either a horse or a snake hand-SXSSHWWRHOLFLWFKLOGUHQ¶VUHVSRQVHV 
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4.1.2 Design and procedure. Design and procedure were identical to those in 
Experiment 1b, with the following exceptions. 
4.1.2.1 Pretraining task. Following the Hedonic Value Check task, children 
completed an unscored pretraining task. This task was intended to make salient past versus 
future times, and familiarize children with the idea that two characters did the same thing but 
at different times. Children were introduced to one of two hand-puppets (Mr. Horse or Mr. 
Snake) and told that they would play a game in which some children have done certain things 
already, and some have not done them yet. Children were told that the puppet sometimes gets 
confused and cannot remember who has and has not already done something, and were asked 
to help the puppet. They were then introduced to two characters (girls saw pictures of female 
children, and boys saw pictures of male children). Pictures of an unmade bed and a backpack 
containing school equipment were placed above the picture of the character on the left, who 
had short hair. Pictures of a house and a dinner plate were placed above the picture of the 
character on the right, who had long hair (Fig. 2).  Children were told that µLW¶VDKDLUFXWGD\
IRUWKHPWRGD\¶. The experimenter explained that this morning, (e.g.) ³Nelly got out of bed 
and got ready for school and then had her hair cut´ and that ³tonight, Orla is going to go 
home from school, have her dinner, and then have her hair cut´. The experimenter asked the 
puppet to identify the character who ³got out of bed this morning, got ready for school and 
then had her hair cut´, and children were asked to help the puppet when he was not sure. 
Children who responded incorrectly were corrected. The procedure was then repeated for the 
character who ³is going to go home from school and have dinner tonight, and then have her 
hair cut´. In a similarly structured second trial, participants were introduced to two more 
characters, one wearing glasses (placed to the left under the unmade bed and backpack), and 
one without glasses (placed to the right under the house and dinner plate) and told that ³LW¶VD
shopping day for them today´; the character on the left had got out of bed, got ready for 
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school and then gone with her mother to get some glasses to wear, and the character on the 
right would go home from school and have dinner tonight, and then go with her mother to get 
some glasses to wear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Depictions of events used during the Pretraining task with 4±to-5±year-old 
participants, Experiment 1c. 
 
4.1.2.2. Temporal Preference and Emotion Prediction tasks. Participants heard about 
events that occurred/would occur this morning and tonight. Several additional pieces of 
information were also added to the scenarios. First, the painful or pleasurable events were 
mentioned together with other events that children typically encounter during the morning 
and evening of a school day. This was in order to make the past-future locations of the events 
clearE\FDSLWDOL]LQJRQ\RXQJFKLOGUHQ¶VJUDVSRIWKHVHTXHQFHRIHYHQWVLQDW\SLFDOGD\. 
Second, participants were told not only that a character is not experiencing a particular event 
now, but that he/she is engaged in another completely different activity right now (e.g., 
painting or sitting on the mat). This was to emphasize that the hedonic experiences in 
question were not currently ongoing. Extensive piloting suggested that young children found 
it easier to grasp that (e.g.) a past event was not still ongoing if they were informed that the 
character was engaged in a different activity.  
Thus, participants heard (e.g.): ³This is Annie, and this is Betty. Both of them feel 
fine now. This morning Annie got out of bed and got ready for school, and then she had a 
painful injection. After she had the injection she went to school, and right now she is doing 
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numbers at school. And right now Betty is doing numbers at school as well. Tonight Betty is 
going to go home from school and have dinner, and then she will have a painful injection´, 
with the experimenter pointing to appropriate pictures throughout. This scenario was then 
repeated: ³So Annie had a painful injection earlier this morning. She isn't having one right 
QRZWKRXJKVKHKDGLWWKLVPRUQLQJDQGULJKWQRZVKH¶VGRLQJQXPEHUVDWVFKRRODQGVKH¶V
QRWLQSDLQ$QG%HWW\LVJRLQJWRKDYHDSDLQIXOLQMHFWLRQODWHUWKLVHYHQLQJ6KHLVQ¶Whaving 
RQHULJKWQRZWKRXJKVKHLVGRLQJQXPEHUVDWVFKRRODQGVKH¶VQRWLQSDLQDQGVKH¶OOKDYH
the injection this evening.´  
Children were then asked two types of memory check questions. First, they were 
asked to identify the person who had had the painful or pleasurable experience µWKLV
PRUQLQJ¶, and the person who would KDYHLWµWRQLJKW¶Next, they were asked whether each 
character was having the experience µULJKWnow¶ If a child gave an incorrect answer to any of 
these questions the experimenter repeated the scenario description, and the question was put 
to the child again. 5HJDUGOHVVRIWKHFKLOG¶VDQVZHUWRDUHSHDWHGTXHVWLRQWKHH[SHULPHQW
then continued with the same four Temporal Preference and Emotion Predictions trials used 
in Experiment 1b. 
Once children had completed all four trials, they were asked two follow-up 
comprehension questions in order to probe their understanding of µUDWKHUEH¶TXHVWLRQXVHG in 
the Temporal Preference trials. They were first introduced to two new characters and told 
³This is [e.g.] Jane and this is Kate. Jane has a delicious ice-cream. Kate has no ice-cream at 
all. Who would you rather be? Jane who has a delicious ice-cream or Kate who has no ice-
cream at all?´ Next, they were introduced to two more characters, and told ³This is [e.g.] 
/XF\DQGWKLVLV0LFKHOOH/XF\KDVDVRUHILQJHU0LFKHOOHGRHVQ¶WKDYHDVRUHILQJHU:KR
would you rather be? Lucy who has a sore finger or 0LFKHOOHZKRGRHVQ¶t have a sore 
finger?´ 
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4.1.2.3 Data scoring and analysis. Data scoring and analysis were conducted in an 
identical manner to Experiments 1a and b, with the addition of two procedures. First, if 
during the Temporal Preference or Emotion Prediction trials a child failed to correctly answer 
after two attempts any memory question, the FKLOG¶VGDWDIRUWKH trial in question was 
excluded from analysis. If as a result only one valid trial remained for a given child, the 
FKLOG¶VGDWDZHUe excluded from analyses entirely. Second, if in the follow-up comprehension 
questions a child stated that they would rather be the person with no ice-cream at all or the 
person with the sore finger, all data for that child were excluded. 
4.2 Results of Experiment 1c 
Results from the Temporal Preference and Emotion Prediction tasks are reported in 
Table 2, where they are shown as a proportion of participants who demonstrated temporal 
location preferences in the expected direction. Table S3 of the Supplemental Material reports 
data for the Hedonic Value check task; these ratings indicate that the experiences had the 
appropriate hedonic value. As in the previous experiments, we excluded judgments for any 
experiences for which children did not make the appropriate hedonic value rating.  
We examined performance against chance levels using 2-tailed binomial tests. Four-
to-five year-olds demonstrated the expected temporal preference for pain, preferring their 
pain to lie in the past. However, four-to-five-year-olds showed a preference opposite to that 
of older children and adults, in that they also preferred their pleasure in the past. Children 
were at chance on both types of Emotion Prediction trials. 
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Table 2 
Results of 2-tailed binomial tests against chance, Experiment 1c. Percentages represent the 
proportion of 4±5-year-olds who demonstrated temporal location preferences in the expected 
direction. 
Trial type  Valence 
(N = 35) 
Frequency 
(%) 
95% CI p Consistent 
across trial 
type (%)a 
Pleasure Temporal Preference (n = 25) 11 (31%) 0.17, 0.49 .041# 4 (12.2%) 
     Emotion prediction (n = 33) 15 (45%) 0.28, 0.64 .728 
Pain Temporal Preference (n = 26) 19 (73%) 0.52, 0.88 .029 1 (4.76%) 
 Emotion prediction (n = 28) 10 (36%) 0.18, 0.56 .185 
Note. Participant numbers vary across trials because data from participants who did not report 
the appropriate hedonic value for a specific experience was removed on the relevant trial.  
a Percentages represent proportion of participants who completed both trial types. 
# Significantly different to chance in the direction opposite to that expected. 
We submitted the data to two GEE analyses with binomial distributions and logit-log 
link functions, using valence as a predictor of judgment and rating on the Hedonic Value 
check task as a covariate. For Temporal Preference trials there was no effect of rating (p = 
.728) and a main effect of valence, demonstrating that at the same levels of rating, 4±to±5-
year-olds were more likely to make a judgment in the expected direction for painful than for 
pleasurable events (Wald F2 (1) = 8.67, p = .003, b = -1.81, 95% CI [-3.01, .61], SE = .62, 
Exp(B) = .16, 95% CI [.049, .55]). For Emotion Prediction trials there was no effect of rating 
(p = .224) and a trend towards an effect of valence (Wald F2 (1) = 3.53, p = .060, b = 1.42, 
95% CI [-.06, 2.90], SE = .75, Exp(B) = .4.13, 95% CI [.941, 18.14]). While it did not reach 
significance, we note that this effect reflects the greater frequency with which 4±to±5-year-
olds made judgments in the expected direction for pleasurable than for painful events. 
4.3 Discussion of Experiment 1c 
When considering painful experiences, 4-to-5-year-olds demonstrated temporal 
preferences consistent with those of the older children and adults, preferring pain to lie in the 
past. However, for pleasant experiences they demonstrated the opposite preference, in that 
they also preferred pleasure to lie in the past. We are confident that the different pattern of 
performance displayed by these younger children was not due to a difficulty understanding 
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the task or keeping track of the relevant information. We checked whether children were able 
to report which character had already had the experience in the past and which would have it 
in the future, and that the experience was not ongoing right now. There was also a check that 
children understood the nature of the µUDWKHUEH¶question. The fact that data from a sizable 
minority of children had to be discarded because they did not pass these questions 
demonstrates that such checks were necessary, and casts doubts on whether any conclusions 
can be drawn from the data from this age group in Experiment 1b in which there were no 
such checks.  
Why did these young children express a preference for pleasurable experiences to lie 
in the past? Since they chose the past for both pleasurable and painful events, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that children of this age have a general bias to choose the past; however, 
we have no theoretical basis on which to expect such a bias. We again asked children to 
explain their answers, but it was difficult to discern any clear patterns because children 
struggled to provide substantive explanations of their choices. Some of their explanations 
suggest that they assume that having had the experience would have made them happy (e.g., 
ZLWKUHJDUGWRHDWLQJWKHGRQXWV³%HFDXVH,ZRXOGEHsuper-duper happy because I already 
had them´³%HFDXVH,ZDQWWKHGRQXWVILUVWEHFDXVHthey¶re GHOLFLRXV´ We note from 
inspection of the explanations given in Experiment 1b that by the time children are 7 years of 
age their explanations for their preferences start to become somewhat more coherent, with 
QXPHURXVFKLOGUHQUHIHUULQJWRWKHLGHDRI³ORRNLQJIRUZDUG´WRDSOHDVXUDEOHDFWLYLW\WKLV
type of explanation DOVRDSSHDUVLQDGXOWV¶H[SODQDWLRQV. Very young children would not be 
expected to use the specific WHUP³ORRNLQJIRUZDUG´, because this phrase is a metaphorical 
one that hinges on a time-space mapping, and children of this age are just beginning to 
acquire conventional time-space mappings and relevant metaphorical skills (Tillman, 
Tulagan, Fukuda, & Barner, 2018; Stites 	g]oDOLúNDQ). Nevertheless, their temporal 
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preference for pleasant experiences suggests that younger children do not yet grasp the idea 
that anticipating a positive experience is typically pleasurable; instead, they seem to focus on 
the pleasure that would have resulted from an experience in the past.  
Four±to±five-year-olds were at chance in the Emotion Prediction trials. Notably, 
children failed to judge significantly more often than chance that someone feels sadder when 
a pain is in the future rather than the past, despite themselves having a preference for past 
over future pain. The type of emotion prediction at issue here is more complex than that 
frequently studied in young children. In most previous studies, children typically have to 
appropriately connect types of experiences or situations to types of emotions (Harris, 2008; 
Widen & Russell, 2008). Preschoolers clearly understand that certain experiences typically 
result in specific emotions, but the current task required children to further consider whether 
the experience in question was in the past or yet to come. We return in the General 
Discussion to considering the cognitive demands that this places on young children.  
5. Experiments 2a and 2b 
In Experiment 2, we offered participants the opportunity to trade off a larger amount 
of past pleasure against a smaller amount of future pleasure and a smaller amount of future 
pain against a larger amount of past pain. The task began by asking participants to make a 
similar temporal preference judgment to that in Experiment 1; if participants answered in the 
expected direction, the amount of past pain or pleasure was then increased incrementally in 
order to observe whether there was a trade-off point at which people would prefer past 
pleasure or future pain. Of interest was the magnitude of this trade-off point. We tested both 
adults (Experiment 2a) and children (2b); again, due to the similarity of the procedures we 
present the results for both experiments together. Participants again answered questions about 
their temporal preferences, but in a change to the procedure used in Experiment 1, rather than 
asking participants to predict emotions, we asked WKHPDERXWRWKHUSHRSOH¶VWHPSRUDO
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preferences. The pattern of results from Experiment 1 suggested that, in general, temporal 
biases were less in evidence in the Emotion Prediction task than in the Temporal Preference 
task, and this was true even for the adult sample in Experiment 1a. There are two possible 
explanations of this difference: one possibility is that it was because the Emotion Prediction 
task specifically asked participants about relative levels of positive or negative emotions 
rather than preferences. For example, as noted above, inspection of the adult explanations of 
their answers suggested that people believe the determinants of emotion levels regarding 
pleasurable events are potentially more complex than simple preferences and may be affected 
by mental states such as memories. Even in the adult group, for pleasurable experiences 
participants gave a consistent response to Temporal Preference and Emotion Prediction 
questions only 62% of the time, suggesting they approached these two questions in different 
ways. If the nature of the judgment that participants were asked to make affected level of 
temporal bias, then if we ask LQVWHDGDERXWRWKHUSHRSOH¶VSUHIHUHQFHVUDWKHUWKDQ their levels 
of emotion, similar levels of temporal bias may be observed. Such similarity might be 
predicted if people assume that past-future hedonic preferences are sensible and ubiquitous 
(Hare, 2013).  
The other possibility is that temporal biases were less in evidence in the Emotion 
Prediction task because that task concerned the perspective of other people, rather than the 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶VRZQSHUVSHFWLYH,QWKHLUVWXG\RISDVW-future asymmetries in value judgments, 
Caruso et al. (2008) reported that such asymmetries were absent when participants had to 
consider how much another person should be paid for boring data entry work in the past 
versus the future, and suggested that when considering another person, the irrelevance of the 
event to the self leads to a reduced differential between affective engagement with future and 
past events. *UHHQHHWDODOVRIRXQGWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SDVW-future hedonic preferences 
ZHUHOHVVPDUNHGZKHQFRQVLGHULQJDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VSHUVSHFWLYHWKDQZKHQFRQVLGHULQJWKHLU
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own. In Experiment 2, by asking participants to make a judgmenWDERXWDQRWKHU¶VSUHIHUHQFH
we were able to examine whether taking a more detached perspective on experiences would 
reduce past-future hedonic preferences.  
5.1 Experiment 2a 
5.1.1 Method. 
5.1.1.1 Participants. Forty-one adults (M = 28 years, SD = 15.09, range: 18±76 
years1, nine males) participated in the experiment. Participants were recruited through an 
undergraduate research pool, in which case they received course credit, or as part of a lab-
based outreach activity, in which case they received no compensation. Two participants did 
not report their age.  
5.1.1.2 Design, materials and procedure. Materials were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1a save for two changes that allowed the experiences to be plausibly repeated 
within the space of a few weeks. The pleasurable experiences involved a character eating µD
free meal at one oIKLVKHUIDYRULWHUHVWDXUDQWV¶RUµan all-expenses-paid evening out with 
good friends¶. Stimuli for Experiment 2a are depicted in Fig. 3. 
Adults completed the experiment using their own computers or mobile devices. The 
experiment was presented using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The significance of coefficients for analyses in this section does not change when adults aged over two 
standard deviations above the mean are excluded from the analysis. 
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Fig. 3. Depictions of events used during the Hedonic Value Check with children (above) and 
adults (below) in Experiments 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b. Stimuli depict the events described during 
the subsequent Temporal Preference trials. 
 
Participants completed four trials, two concerning their own preferences (Self trials) 
and two concerning those of another person (Other trials). For each of these two trial types, 
they completed one trial about a painful experience and one about a pleasant experience. The 
specific painful or pleasant experience used for Self versus Other trials was counterbalanced 
across participants, and the order in which participants completed Self versus Other trials was 
also counterbalanced.  
5.1.1.3 Hedonic Value Check. The Hedonic Value Check was identical to that used in 
Experiment 1a. 
5.1.1.4 Temporal Preference Task. All participants completed a minimum of two 
Self trials (Pain-Self, Pleasure-Self) and two Other trials (Pain-Other and Pleasure-Other). 
The number of additional judgments was depeQGHQWXSRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DQVZHUV during the 
first trial of each type. 
Self trials were structured identically to the Temporal Preference Trials in Experiment 
1a, save for three differences. First, to increase the plausibility of multiple episodes of the 
experience, past events ZHUHVDLGWRKDYHWDNHQSODFH³LQWKHODVWWKUHHPRQWKV´and future 
HYHQWVZHUHWRWDNHSODFH³LQWKHQH[WWKUHHPRQWKV´. Second, within each trial type, 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ decisions to favor certain temporal preferences led to the presentation of 
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additional questions. If participants demonstrated the expected temporal preference for 
SOHDVXUHLQWKHIXWXUHRUIRUSDLQLQWKHSDVWRQWKHILUVWTXHVWLRQKHQFHIRUWKµEDVHOLQH
TXHVWLRQ¶DVHFRQGTXHVWLRQZDVSUHVHQWHGSUHFHGHGE\WKHZRUGV³6RPHWKLQJLVGLIIHUHQW´. 
In this question, the person who had experienced the relevant event in the past had done so 
twice (e.g., µ&ODUHDWe two free meals in some of her favorite restaurants in the last three 
PRQWKV¶) whereas the person who would experience the event in the future would do so only 
once (e.g., µ'DLV\will eat one free meal at one of her favorite restaurants in the next three 
months¶). If at this stage participants switched their temporal preference, the point at which 
they had made this trade-off between amount of pleasure/pain and its temporal location was 
recorded as being two events. They were then presented with the next Self trial type, which 
reverted to presenting a choice between one past and one future event.  
However, if participants did not switch their temporal preference, a further question 
increased the number of past events in the trade-off to four (versus one). This pattern of 
questioning continued such that if participants did not switch their temporal preference within 
a trial type, they were offered six events versus one event, then eight versus one and then ten 
versus one. If those participants who reached a question regarding 10 events retained their 
initial temporal preference, the final question within the trial described the choice as one 
between ³VRPH´ events in the past and one in the future, and asked (e.g.,) ³+RZPDQ\
expenses-paid evenings out with good friends would Clare have to have had in the last three 
months beIRUH\RXZRXOGUDWKHUEH&ODUH"´ Participants entered either a number or a text 
response into a free-text response field. We did not ask participants to explain their choices. 
The final difference was that participants were told that the two characters lived in 
different cities and did not know each other; this was to minimize the possibility that 
participants considered the hypothetical impact of an experience undergone by one character 
on the other character.   
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In Other trials, unlike Self trials, participants ZHUHDVNHGDERXWDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶V
preferences. Prior to each Other trial, an additional, stylistically distinct line drawing of a 
person was presented (Zoe for female participants, and Zach for male participants). 
Participants heard that this person lives in a different city and has some decisions to make, 
and that they would now answer some questions about this person. All Other trials concluded 
with the question µ:KRZRXOG=RH=DFKUDWKHUEH"¶, but otherwise they were identical to Self 
trials. 
5.1.1.5 Data Scoring and Analysis. Coding for the Hedonic Value Check task and for the 
baseline question of the Temporal Preference Task (which presented a single event in both 
the past and the future) was conducted in an identical manner to Experiment 1a, as was the 
SURFHVVRIH[FOXGLQJWULDOV3DUWLFLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVWRWKHUHPDLQLQJTXHVWLRQVKHQFHIRUWK
µWUDGH-RIITXHVWLRQV¶RQWKH7HPSRUDO3UHIHUHQFHWDVNUHFHLYHGDVLQJOHVFRUHHTXDOLQJWKH
number of past events presented during the trial on which they switched their temporal 
preference. If participants reached the final question (how many past events would have to 
take place before the participant would switch their temporal preference) and responded with 
a number greater than 10 or replied that they would not switch regardless, their response was 
UHFRUGHGDVµJUHDWHUWKDQRUQHYHU¶'DWDIURPWKLVWDVNZHUHWKHUHIRUHWUHDWHGDVRUGLQDO 
5.2 Experiment 2b 
5.2.1 Method. 
5.2.1.1 Participants. Seventy-one children (30 males) between the ages of 96±143 
months were recruited from schools and summer programs or tested in the laboratory at the 
OHDGDXWKRU¶VLQVWLWXWLRQ7KHVDPSOHZDVVSOLWE\age: thirty-two 7±8-year-olds (M = 102.25 
months, SD = 3.99, range: 96-107 months) and thirty-nine 10±11-year-olds (M = 134.54 
months, SD = 6.0, range: 122-143 months). Children were tested in a quiet place at their 
school or summer program, or in a dedicated room at the laboratory.  
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5.2.1.2 Design, materials and procedure. The task was administered by an 
experimenter and children gave verbal responses or pointed at their answers. The Hedonic 
Value Check was structurally identical to the check used in Experiment 1b. The design of the 
Temporal Preference task was identical to that in Experiment 2a, save for modifications to 
ensure that the task was suitable for children. The pleasurable experiences were the character 
eating ³DGHOLFLRXVVFRRSRILFH-FUHDP´ and having ³DJRRQDERXQF\VOLGH´; the unpleasant 
experiences were ³an hour of waiting tKDWZDV>ZLOOEH@UHDOO\ERULQJ´ DQG³DSDLQIXO
LQMHFWLRQ´. Stimuli for Experiment 2b are depicted in Fig. 3. Past events were said to have 
WDNHQSODFH³LQWKHODVWZHHN´DQGIXWXUHHYHQWVZHUHWRWDNHSODFH³LQWKHQH[WZHHN´ 
5.2.1.3 Data Scoring and Analysis. Data scoring and analysis was carried out in an 
identical manner to Experiment 2a. 
5.3 Results of Experiments 2a and 2b 
Tables S4 (adults) and S5 (children) in the Supplemental Material report data from the 
Hedonic Value Check task by event, and indicate that the experiences had the appropriate 
hedonic value. Results from the baseline question in the Temporal Preference task are 
reported in Table 3 and results from the trade-off questions of the Temporal Preference task 
are shown in Fig. 4. 
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Table 3 
Results of 2-tailed binomial tests against chance, Experiment 2. Percentages represent the 
proportion of participants who demonstrated temporal location preferences in the expected 
direction. 
Age group and trial type Frequency (%) 95% CI p 
7-8 (N = 32)    
    Pleasure-Self (n = 32) 24 (75%) 0.57, 0.89 .007 
    Pain-Self (n = 30) 24 (80%) 0.61, 0.92 .001 
    Pleasure-Other (n = 30) 23 (77%) 0.58, 0.90 .005 
    Pain-Other (n = 25) 18 (72%) 0.50, 0.88 .043 
10-11 (N = 41)    
    Pleasure-Self (n = 39) 27 (71%) 0.54, 0.85 .014 
    Pain-Self (n = 33) 28 (85%) 0.68, 0.95 < . 001 
    Pleasure-Other (n = 37) 28 (76%) 0.59, 0.88 .003 
    Pain-Other (n = 34) 28 (82%) 0.65, 0.93 < . 001 
Adults (N = 41)    
    Pleasure-Self (n = 38) 35 (92%) 0.79, 0.98 < .001 
    Pain-Self (n = 37) 36 (97%) 0.86, 1 < .001 
    Pleasure-Other (n = 39) 32 (82%) 0.66, 0.92 < .001 
    Pain-Other (n = 38) 37 (97%) 0.86, 1 < .001 
Note. Participant numbers vary across trials because data from participants who did not report 
the appropriate hedonic value for a specific experience was removed on the relevant trial.  
 
We first H[DPLQHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVRQWKHbaseline question of the Temporal 
Preference task against chance levels using two-tailed binomial tests. All groups of 
participants demonstrated the expected temporal preferences at a rate above chance on all 
four types of trial (see Table 3). To investigate the effect of valence (pain or pleasure) and 
perspective (self or other) and, in the case of children, age group, on SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ temporal 
preference in the baseline trial, we submitted the data to GEE analyses with binomial 
distributions, logit-log link functions and independent covariance structures. We separately 
examined data from children and adults. Several analyses were conducted using combinations 
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of valence, perspective, and their interaction as predictors of temporal preference, with 
hedonic rating as a covariate. None of the models were significant.  
 
Fig. 4. Proportion of (a) 7±8-year-olds, (b) 10±11-year-olds, and (c) adults trading off 
temporal preference for less pain or more pleasure at each number of past events, Temporal 
Preference task, Experiments 2a and 2b.  
 
Next we examined trade-off points for those participants who had answered the 
baseline question by indicating that they preferred pain in the past or pleasure in the future. 
For every trial type, and for every age group, the modal, and majority, trade-off point was 
two past events (see Fig. 4). A much smaller proportion traded off for the other event 
quantities, although a notable minority indicated that they would trade off temporal 
preference for less pain or more pleasure only if the number of past events exceeded 10 
(range: 11 to never). 
We then investigated the effect of valence and perspective on trade-off points. Data 
were submitted to GEE analyses with multinomial distributions, cumulative logit-log link 
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functions and independent covariance structures. :HILUVWH[DPLQHGDGXOWV¶GDWD6HYHUDO
analyses were conducted using combinations of valence, perspective, and their interaction as 
predictors of trade-off point, with rating as a covariate. None of the models were significant.  
 1H[WZHH[DPLQHGFKLOGUHQ¶VGDWDAn initial analysis was conducted using valence, 
perspective, age group, and all two-way interactions between them as predictors of trade-off 
point, with rating as a covariate. There was a marginal effect of age group (p = .050) and a 
significant effect of rating (p = .016). The model yielded no other significant effects (all ps > 
.103). All interactions were then removed and the subsequent model was retained. This 
analysis demonstrated that FKLOGUHQ¶VDJHSUHGLFWHG their trade-off point (Wald F2 (1) = 3.93, 
p = .047, b = -.78, 95% CI [-1.56, -.01], SE = .40). Collapsed across valence and perspective 
and at the same levels of rating, 7±8-year-olds demonstrated lower odds of selecting a 
relatively higher trade-off point (i.e., changed their temporal preferences sooner) than 10±11-
year-olds (Exp(B) = .46, 95% CI [.21, .99]). This analysis also demonstrated that, regardless 
of whether an experience was pleasant or painful, the stronger the hedonic rating, the sooner 
children traded off their initial temporal preference in favor of less pain or more pleasure 
(Wald F2 (1) = 6.10, p = .013, b = -.51, 95% CI [-.91, -.10], SE = .20, Exp(B) = .60, 95% CI 
[.40, .90]). 
5.4 Discussion of Experiments 2a and 2b 
When the number of past and future events was fixed at one HYHQWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶past-
future hedonic preferences closely replicated those demonstrated in Experiment 1a and 1b. 
This was true for both adults and children, and participants showed a very similar pattern of 
UHVXOWVZKHQSUHGLFWLQJDQRWKHU¶VSUHIHUHQFHV (i.e., we did not find a significant effect of 
perspective). However, the temporal bias was far from absolute. At the first opportunity (two 
past events), the majority of participants switched their preference if the amount of past 
pleasure or pain exceeded that of future pleasure or pain, and thought that others would do 
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the same. Younger children were likely to trade off their temporal preference for more 
pleasure or less pain somewhat earlier than were older children. While the hedonic intensity 
attributed to an experience (given in the Hedonic Value Check task) did not affect the point at 
which adults made their trade-offs, it influenced the point at which children did so. The 
greater the hedonic intensity imagined by children for an experience, the sooner the point at 
which they traded off their temporal preference for less pain or more pleasure.  
3DUWLFLSDQWV¶WHQGHQF\WRVZLWFKWKHLUSDVW-future hedonic preferences when the 
number of past events exceeded the number of future events might be thought to be 
surprising given previous suggestions about large or even absolute discounting of past 
experiences (Suhler & Callender, 2012; Sullivan, 2018). Our procedure was such that 
participants themselves terminated each trial type when they switched temporal preferences, 
and it is possible that this aspect of the procedure contributed to the early trade-off points. An 
alternative would have been to make all participants complete the same set of judgments for 
each trial type. An important part of our motivation in ending a trial type when participants 
switched preference was to reduce the number of repeated judgments that participants had to 
make. In particular, we were concerned that children might lose interest in the task if they had 
to make very large numbers of similar judgments. We note that in the temporal discounting 
literature it is common to use procedures where trial numbers are not fixed; rather, many 
studies use a titration approach whereby the judgments participants have to make vary across 
participants in order to identify an indifference point more quickly. Arguably our procedure 
can be seen as a simplified version of such an approach. Existing research on temporal 
discounting suggests that a titration approach versus a fixed number of trials yield similar 
results (Rodzon, Berry, & Odum, 2011). Another factor that may have affected trade-off 
points is in the inclusion of the baseline trial, which offered an equal number of events. The 
contrast between this trial and the trade-off trials, which increased the number of past events, 
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may have been a highly salient one. In these circumstances, participants might be particularly 
swayed in their preferences by the greater number of past events. For this reason, we 
conducted a further final set of experiments (Experiment 3a with adults and 3b with children) 
in which we removed the baseline trial.  
6. Experiments 3a and 3b 
6.1 Experiment 3a 
6.1.2 Method. 
6.1.2.1 Participants. One hundred adults (M = 27.6 years, SD = 6.66, range: 18±46 
years, 52 males) participated. All adult participants reported that they were fluent in English. 
Data collection took place online, using the Prolific subject pool (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, 
& Acquisti, 2017). Participants each received compensation of approximately US $2.50.  
6.1.2.2 Design, materials and procedure. The materials and Hedonic Value Check 
were identical to those used in Experiment 2a.  
6.1.2.3 Temporal Preference Task. The Temporal Preference Task was identical to 
that used in Experiment 2a, save for two differences. First, participants were not asked any 
questions that presented a choice between one past and one future event. Rather, the first 
question within each trial type was a trade-off question presenting a choice between two past 
events versus one future event. Trade-off questions then proceeded as described for 
Experiment 2a. Second, each subsequent TXHVWLRQZDVSUHFHGHGE\WKHZRUGVµ+HUH¶VDQRWKHU
GHFLVLRQ¶UDWKHUWKDQE\WKHZRUGVµ6RPHWKLQJLVGLIIHUHQW¶ 
6.1.2.4 Data scoring and analysis. Coding for the Hedonic Value Check and 
Temporal Preference task was conducted in an identical manner to Experiment 2a, save that 
no baseline question involving only one past and one future event was asked. 
6.2 Experiment 3b 
6.2.1 Method. 
PAST-FUTURE PREFERENCES FOR HEDONIC GOODS 
 40 
6.2.1.1 Participants. Sixty-one children (39 males) between the ages of 94 and 143 
months were recruited and tested in the same manner as in Experiment 2b. The sample was 
split by age: 28 7±8-year-olds (M = 100.43 months, SD = 3.68, range: 94±106 months) and 
33 10±11-year-olds (M = 136.09 months, SD = 3.5, range: 130±143 months) participated in 
the experiment.  
6.2.1.2 Design, materials and procedure. The materials and Hedonic Value Check 
were identical to those used in Experiment 2b. The design of the Temporal Preference task 
was identical to that used with adults in Experiment 3a, in that no initial baseline question 
was asked. 
6.2.1.3 Data scoring and analysis. Coding for the Hedonic Value Check and 
Temporal Preference task was conducted in an identical manner to Experiment 3a. 
6.3 Results of Experiments 3a and 3b 
Results for the Temporal Preference task are shown in Fig. 5 by trial type. Tables S6 
(adults) and S7 (children) of the Supplemental Material report data for the Ratings task by 
event and indicate that the experiences had the appropriate hedonic value.  
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Fig. 5. Proportion of (a) 7±8-year-olds, (b) 10±11-year-olds, and (c) adults trading off 
temporal preference for less pain or more pleasure at each number of past events, Temporal 
Preference task, Experiments 3a and 3b.  
For every trial type and for all age groups the modal trade-off point was again two 
past events, regardless of valence or perspective. A much smaller proportion from every age 
group traded off at six, eight, or 10 events, and a notable minority indicated that they would 
trade off temporal preference for less pain or more pleasure if the number of past events 
exceeded 10 (range: 11 to never). Thus, at the first opportunity, all participants were likely to 
trade off their temporal preferences in order to have more pleasure or less pain overall, and 
this was the case even though this was the first judgment that participants had to make. 
Next, we again investigated the effect of valence and perspective on SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
willingness to trade off an initial temporal preference in the expected direction for more 
pleasurable events or fewer painful events overall. Data were submitted to GEE analyses with 
multinomial distributions, cumulative logit-log link functions and independent covariance 
structures. :HILUVWH[DPLQHGDGXOWV¶GDWDAn initial analysis was conducted using valence, 
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perspective, and their interaction as predictors of trade-off point, with rating as a covariate. 
There was a main effect of valence (p < .001) and no other significant effects (all ps > .495). 
The interactions were removed from the model. The main effect of valence remained (Wald 
F2 (1) = 11.20, p < .001, b = -.69, 95% CI [-1.09, -.285], SE = .21, Exp(B) = .503, 95% CI 
[.34, .75]), and there were no other significant effects (rating, p =  .499; perspective, p = 
.860). This model was retained. Thus, when experiences were pleasant rather than painful 
there was an increase in the odds of selecting a relatively lower trade-off point.  
:HWKHQH[DPLQHGFKLOGUHQ¶VGDWD An initial analysis was conducted using valence, 
perspective, age group, and all two-way interactions as predictors of trade-off point, with 
rating as a covariate. There was a main effect of rating (p = .015), an effect of the interaction 
between valence and perspective (p = .008), and a trend towards a main effect of perspective 
(p = .057). There were no other significant effects (all ps > .100). The interactions between 
perspective and age group and between valence and age group were removed from the model, 
leaving valence, perspective, age group, and the interaction between valence and perspective 
as predictors of trade-off point, with rating as a covariate. There was a main effect of rating 
(p = .013) and an effect of the interaction between valence and perspective (p = .007), but no 
main effect of perspective (p = .081), valence (p = .075) or age group (p = .223). This model 
was retained. This model demonstrated a main effect of rating (Wald F2 (1) = 6.18, b = -.56, 
95% CI [-1, -.12], SE = .22, Exp(B) = .57, 95% CI [.37, .89]), and an interaction between 
valence and perspective (Wald F2 (1) = 7.34, b = -1.44, 95% CI [-2.48, -.40], SE = .53, 
Exp(B) = .24, 95% CI [.08, .67]). Subsequent follow-up analyses suggested that interaction 
between valence and perspective was driven by the relatively early trade-off point for Pain-
Other trials (see lightest bars in the top two panels of Fig. 5); these trials differed significantly 
from Pain-Self (p = .005, b = 1.16, 95% CI = [.35, 1.98], SE = .42, Exp(B) = 3.20, 95% CI 
[1.42, 7.22]) and Pleasure-Other trials (p = .003, b = 1.20, 95% CI = [.41, 1.98], SE = .40, 
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Exp(B) = 3.31, 95% CI [1.51, 7.27]). 7KXVZKHQFKLOGUHQFRQVLGHUHGRWKHUV¶H[SHULHQFHV
there was an increase in the odds of selecting a relatively lower trade-off point for painful 
than for pleasant experiences; and experiences associated with stronger hedonic intensity 
were associated with faster trade-off of temporal location preferences in favor of a reduction 
in pain or increase in pleasure. 
6.4 Discussion of Experiments 3a and 3b 
([SHULPHQWFRQILUPHGWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHVIRUWKHWHPSRUal location of 
hedonic goods were not absolute. In this experiment, the opportunity for participants to trade 
off their temporal preferences in order to have more pleasure or less pain overall was present 
from the first trial. There was no salient contrast with an earlier scenario involving one event 
in the past and one in the future, as was the case in Experiment 2, but nevertheless adults 
were likely to trade off their temporal preferences at the first opportunity. Adults were likely 
to engage in this trade-off somewhat earlier for pleasure than for pain. This significant effect 
RIYDOHQFHZDVQRWVHHQLQWKHDGXOWV¶WUDGH-off data in Experiment 2a, but looking across 
Experiments 1a and 2a (Tables 1 and 3), it can be seen that in the one versus one cases, a 
slightly lower percentage of adults indicated a temporal preference for pleasure to be in the 
future than for pain to be in the past. Thus, for adults there is some (albeit relatively weak) 
evidence that past-future hedonic preferences are not as strong for pleasure as for pain.  
Children also tended to trade off their temporal preferences at the earliest opportunity. 
However, they did not do this more readily for pleasurable versus painful experiences; rather, 
they were particularly likely to assume that others would do so readily in the case of painful 
experiences (the Pain-Other trials). This perspective effect was specific to the Pain trials and 
only observed in the children. Thus, as in Experiment 2, there was no robust evidence that 
past-future hedonic preferences were stronger when participants considered their own 
perspective compared to when they considered a third-person perspective. Finally, as in 
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Experiment 2b, the stronger the hedonic intensity imagined for an experience (i.e., the ratings 
given in the Hedonic Value Check task), the sooner children traded off their initial preference 
for its temporal location in favor of less pain or more pleasure. However, unlike in 
Experiment 2b, we did not observe any age effects. In Experiment 2b, younger children were 
somewhat faster than older children to trade their temporal preferences for less pain or more 
pleasure. This effect was no longer in evidence in Experiment 3, suggesting that in 
Experiment 2b younger children may have been more strongly influenced than were older 
children by the shift from an equal (one versus one) to an unequal number of events in the 
past and future.  
7. General Discussion 
We conducted the first empirical study of the degree to which both adults and children 
display past-future hedonic preferences. Consistent with the intuitions of Parfit (1984), 
Sullivan (2018) and others, and consistent with the findings of Greene, Miller, and Norton 
(2020), our results suggest that aGXOWV¶ preference for pain to lie in the past and for pleasure to 
lie in the future is ubiquitous. These preferences were also clearly in evidence from the age of 
7 and became more reliable between the ages of 7 and 11. From the age of 7, children also 
expected others to have the same temporal preferences. Even 4-5-year-olds showed a 
preference for pain to lie in the past; however, they were strikingly different from older 
participants in not preferring pleasure to lie in the future. The other notable, and novel, 
finding from our studies was that, in all age groups, participants rapidly abandoned past-
future hedonic preferences in the face of more past pain or pleasure. This suggests that such 
preferences are not absolute. Indeed, in children, we also saw evidence that the hedonic 
intensity of an experience influences the trade-off between amount of pain or pleasure and its 
temporal location. Regardless of whether an experience was pleasant or painful, the more 
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H[WUHPHFKLOGUHQ¶Vhedonic rating of the experience, the sooner they traded off their initial 
preference about its temporal location in favor of less pain or more pleasure.  
7.1 The nature of past-future hedonic preferences 
Evidence that temporal preferences for hedonic goods arise early in development 
lends some support to the argument that they may be a manifestation of a more general 
adaptive tendency to care more about the future than the past (Greene & Sullivan, 2015; 
Suhler & Callender, 2012). This tendency is assumed to have evolved to support action that 
can shape events under SHRSOH¶Vcontrol: that is, those that lie in the future. Even though pains 
and pleasures often simply happen to one rather than being XQGHURQH¶VFRQWURO, people may 
have generalized the motivational significance of this asymmetry of control to goods they 
cannot control (Caruso, 2010; Sullivan, 2018).  
Nevertheless, despite the near-total ubiquity of past-future hedonic preferences, 
participants were (perhaps surprisingly) willing to trade them off when the amount of past 
pain or pleasure was increased. This result suggests WKDW3DUILW¶V(1984) thought experiment, 
which was meant to demonstrate the absolute or near-absolute nature of past-future bias, may 
be a poor guide to everyday preferences. However, ZHGHSDUWHGIURP3DUILW¶V thought 
experiment regarding hedonic temporal preferences in two key ways, which require careful 
consideration.  
First, Parfit deliberately ruled out the influence of memory on preferences by 
stipulating that the post-operative patient in his example had induced amnesia, whereas our 
participants could have considered the impact of presently-held memories deriving from past 
experiences. We acknowledge that the extent to which participants consider only past and 
future experiences (or mental states) when making their choices is not yet clear. Indeed, the 
fact that participanWVMXVWLI\WKHLUSUHIHUHQFHIRUIXWXUHSOHDVXUHVE\UHIHUULQJWR³ORRNLQJ
IRUZDUG´WRIXWXUHH[SHULHQFHVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH\FRQVLGHUWKHUROHRIDcurrent mental state 
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(namely, anticipation of pleasure) in making their judgments. However, as we stated in the 
introduction, it is not clear why this should be seen as a matter of a present mental state 
potentially confounding past-future hedonic preferences, rather than itself being an 
expression of such preferences. 
One advantage of our simple procedure that avoided a complex cover story is that we 
were able to use it with very young children. A further advantage is that there are important 
similarities between the types of choices participants made in Experiments 2 and 3 and the 
types of choices participants make in other sorts of intertemporal choice tasks, most notably 
the much-studied temporal discounting procedure in which participants decide, for example, 
whether to take a smaller reward (e.g., $1) now rather than wait for a larger reward at a later 
time point (e.g., $10 next week). It is possible in any intertemporal choice task, including in 
the current task, that participants engage in chains of reasoning about the additional causal 
consequences of (e.g.) taking a reward at a specific time point. For example, adults in our 
experiments could have reasoned that if they had two free meals out in the last three months, 
they might have saved some money on food that they would have available to spend now. 
Preventing such chains of reasoning would involve introducing a complex cover story 
whereby these types of consequences are explicitly ruled out, and even then it might be 
difficult to capture every possible consequence that might occur to participants. In focusing 
on purely hedonic experiences rather than monetary or other resources, we were attempting to 
minimize the likelihood that participants would start reasoning about the longer term 
consequences or implications of possessing a resource at a particular time. Nevertheless, 
IXWXUHVWXGLHVZLWKDGXOWVZLOOEHQHHGHGWRDGGUHVVWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
judgments are affected by altering aspects of the task cover story, such as whether the 
scenario does or does not involve amnesia. Subsequent studies could also examine whether 
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the current set of findings extends to other types of hedonic experiences beyond those which 
we used in our experiments.  
$VHFRQGGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQRXUWDVNDQG3DUILW¶VWKRXJKWH[SHULPHQWLVWKDW our 
participants were not waiting for information while weighing the auspiciousness or otherwise 
of two possible outcomes. Rather, they were making a choice between two states of affairs. 
While the choice was a hypothetical one, participants were nevertheless operating with a 
presumed agency over the past that is absent from their lived experience. The relief we feel 
when pain is over might be a strong reason to be rationally concerned with its temporal 
location (Hare, 2007, 2008; Parfit, 1984; Prior, 1959), but only in the absence of control over 
the past. Given a hypothetical choice that entails a sense of agency over all events in RQH¶V
past and future, past events may no longer be experienced as µRYHU¶and therefore may no 
longer entail relief. Future research could explore the role of memories and hypothetical 
personal agency over the past in determining preference judgments.  
A further directiRQIRUIXWXUHUHVHDUFKPLJKWEHWRDVVHVVWKHVWUHQJWKRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶
preferences.  The TXHVWLRQµ:KRZRXOG\RXUDWKHUEH"¶offers a binary choice, enabling us to 
H[DPLQHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DEVROXWHSUHIHUHQFHV$QLQGLFDWLRQRIWKHVWUHQJWKRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶
preferences would provide richer data. We took the decision not to present participants with a 
follow-XSVFDOHPHDVXUHIRULQVWDQFHµ+RZPXFKZRXOG\RXUDWKHUEH>SHUVRQ@"¶for two 
reasons. First, while emotion scales have been successfully used to obtain differential ratings 
from preschoolers for identical events that were preceded by two different sets of outcome 
expectations (Asaba, Ong, & Gweon, 2019; Doan, Friedman, & Denison, 2020; Lara, 
Lagattuta, & Kramer, 2019), we reasoned that children might find such a scale difficult in the 
context of temporal preferences, which had not yet been explored with children of any age. 
Our caution was also informed by the fact that the DQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQµZKRZRXOG\RX
UDWKHUEH¶LVE\QDWXUHGLFKRWRPRXV. Second, the reliability of such a measure even for adults 
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was unclear. For instance, some participants may primarily consider the undesirability of 
experiencing any pain at all, and thus give an answer that is low on the scale. Others may 
answer with reference to the desirability of the past temporal location of the pain, and thus 
give an answer that is high on the scale. Future research could explicitly examine the 
reliability of such responses, which may in turn provide another way to gauge the extent, as 
well as the existence, RISDUWLFLSDQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHVIRUWKHWHPSRUDOORFDWLRQRISDLQDQG
pleasure. Given that people experiencing depressive symptoms often have expectations for a 
negative future (Gadassi Polack, Tran, & Joorman, 2020) and demonstrate diminished 
positive future thinking (Gamble, Moreau, Tippett, & Addis, 2019), future research could 
also explore the possibility that mood could impact the strength of such preferences.2 
7.2 Developmental changes 
Although our findings suggest that past-future hedonic preferences emerge relatively 
early in development, aspects of the results also indicate that there are nevertheless 
developmental changes in this type of temporal bias. As far as developmental differences 
from age 7 upwards are concerned, we found in both Experiments 2 and 3 that, for children, 
the more hedonically charged an experience was rated to be, the less weight their temporal 
bias seemed to carry, whereas this was not the case for adults. Furthermore, although we did 
QRWVWDWLVWLFDOO\FRPSDUHDGXOWV¶DQGFKLOGUHQ¶VSUHIHUHQFHVEHFDXVHRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKH
procedures used with these groups, adults less frequently traded off their preferences at the 
first available opportunity (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). Moreover, 7±8-year-olds were somewhat 
less likely than older children (or indeed adults) to show past-future hedonic preferences 
(Experiment 1) and more likely to trade off such preferences earlier (Experiment 2). Taken 
together, the findings suggest that temporal preferences become more entrenched with 
development. 
 
2 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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The most notable developmental shift, though, occurred between 4-5 and 7-8 years, 
with the majority of the youngest children preferring past over future pleasure. Potentially, 
this finding might be seen to be consistent with the developmental findings of Burns et al. 
(2019), who reported that only at around 6 years of age do children reliably report more 
positively-valenced emotions when considering future pleasurable events than when 
considering past pleasurable events. In the absence of any emotional asymmetry in 
preschoolers¶thoughts about future and past pleasures, a GHVLUHWRµEDQN¶WKHSOHDVXUDEOH
experiences might have driven their responses. A related alternative explanation of young 
FKLOGUHQ¶VSUHIHUHQFHIRUSOHDVXUHWROLHLQWKHSDVW is that children of this age find the very 
idea of having to wait for a pleasurable experience aversive (that is, their preferences stem 
from considering the need to wait for a future pleasure). Such an explanation would be 
consistent with the well-documented difficulties preschoolers have with delaying gratification 
(e.g., Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Schwarz, Schrager, & Lyons, 1983). One way to 
examine this possibility might be to look at the relation between delay of gratification 
abilities in young children and their past-future preference for pleasurable experiences. 
Certainly, by the time children are 7 years old, they seem to realize that waiting for a 
pleasurable event is not necessarily aversive, as demonstrated by the fact that some children 
of this age referred WRµORRNLQJIRUZDUG¶ to future pleasures in their explanations of their 
choices. This emerging understanding may in turn be facilitated by developmental changes in 
FKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\WRULFKO\LPDJLQHIXWXUHSOHDVXUDEOHHYHQWVVXFKIXWXUHWKLQNLQJVNLOOVDUH
known to improve over middle childhood (Coughlin et al., 2014). Possible component skills 
include the effective simulation of future experiences, effective retrieval of relevant events 
from episodic memory for the purposes of constructing such simulations, and self-concept 
coherence (Coughlin, Robins, & Ghetti, 2017; Ghetti & Coughlin, 2018). Ghetti and 
Coughlin (2018) suggest that self-concept, which develops into adolescence, may help to 
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structure both search of and selection from autobiographical memory for information that is 
UHOHYDQWWRRQH¶VRZQIXWXUHIt is also plausible that the maturing self-concept could affect 
the nature of the reasoning that children engage in or the mental representation that they 
FRQVWUXFWZKHQDVNHGµ:KRZRXOG\RXUDWKHUEH?¶ 
 Four±to±five-year-olds did show the same preferences as older children and adults for 
painful experiences to lie in the past, by contrast with the developmental pattern for temporal 
preference regarding pleasurable experiences. This suggests the possibility that the latter 
preference is more cognitively mediated than the former, a possibility that is also consistent 
with some (albeit inconsistent) evidence across our studies that even in adults past-future 
preferences for pleasure are not as strong as those for pain, and with the finding of Greene et 
al. (2020) that adults show stronger past-future preferences for negatively valenced events 
than for positively valenced events. 
We note that the fact that the youngest children preferred pain to lie in the past rather 
than the future suggests that we might also expect to see children of this age experiencing the 
emotion of relief when an unpleasant experience has finished. In philosophy, this type of 
relief has been depicted as the emotional counterpart of the preference for painful experiences 
to lie in the past (Hoerl, 2015; Maclaurin & Dyke, 2002; Pearson, 2018). However, to the 
best of our knowledge, developmental studies have not examined when children first 
experience relief of this sort (though see McCormack & Feeney, 2015; Weisberg & Beck, 
2010, 2012).3 Although there are obviously ethical issues around measuring this sort of relief 
in children (insofar as it would involve inducing unpleasant experiences), it would be 
particularly interesting to examine whether there is a developmental association between 
experiencing relief and a preference for pain to lie in the past.  
 
3 The small number of previous developmental studies of relief have focused only on relief on discovering that 
one has avoided a less optimal outcome in a decision-making task, i.e., what Hoerl (2015) refers to as 
µFRXQWHUIDFWXDO¶UDWKHUWKDQµWHPSRUDO¶UHOLHI.   
PAST-FUTURE PREFERENCES FOR HEDONIC GOODS 
 51 
7.3 3UHGLFWLQJRWKHUV¶HPRWLRQVDQGSUHIHUHQFHV 
The emotion prediction task was particularly challenging for 4-5-year-olds (and even 
for some 7-8-year-olds, particularly with regard to unpleasant experiences). Preschoolers 
showed a distinct pattern of temporal preferences for themselves in Experiment 1c, but did 
not predict that the degree of happiness or sadness that another person would experience 
would differ depending on whether an experience was in the past or the future. Using tense in 
this way to infer the strength of an emotion requires children to consider more than simple 
causal links between types of experiences and types of emotions (Harris & Olthof, 1982); it 
requires considering more complex causal connections stretching over time between 
experiences, thoughts, and feelings. Preschoolers are beginning to understand that emotions 
can be independent of the current situation because they are causally connected to 
remembering the past or imagining the future (Lagattuta, Kramer, Kennedy, Hjortsvang, & 
Goldfarb, 2015; Lagattuta, Tashjian, & Kramer, 2018). For example, by the time children are 
5, they seem to understand that being reminded of a past unpleasant experience can cause 
sadness, even though the experience is no longer happening (Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001; 
Lagattuta, Wellman, & Flavell, 1997), and moreover that, because of a past negative 
experience, someone can be worried about the future (Lagattuta, 2007). It may be a further 
step to grasp that although thinking about a previous negative experience can indeed cause 
current unhappiness, nevertheless that unhappiness may be tempered by being glad about the 
very fact that the experience is now located in the past.   
We note, though, thatHYHQWKRXJKWKH\VWUXJJOHGWRPDNHSUHGLFWLRQVDERXWRWKHUV¶
emotions, the 4-5-year-olds did have temporal preferences for themselves. Although we 
DVNHGSUHVFKRROHUVVSHFLILFDOO\WRUHDVRQDERXWRWKHUV¶HPRWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQSUHIHUHQFHVit is 
worth considering how this finding compares with existing research that suggests that 
preschoolers find it more difficult to reason about their own future preferences than about 
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those of peers and adults (Bélanger, Atance, Varghese, Nguyen, & Vendetti, 2014). One way 
to approach this issue is by considering the distinction Bélanger et al. make between the 
episodic and semantic components of future mental time travel. These authors suggest that 
\RXQJFKLOGUHQ¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIWKHLURZQIXWXUHSUHIHUHQFHVPLJKWGUDZRQERWKW\SHVRI
knowledge, encountering difficulty when attempting to engage an immature episodic system 
WKDWLVVWURQJO\HQJDJHGZLWKFXUUHQWFLUFXPVWDQFHVZKHUHDVWKHLUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIRWKHUV¶
future preferences may rely to a greater extent on the semantic system. The tasks presented 
by Bélanger et al. asked children about their own preferences or those of a peer once they are 
µDOOJURZQXS¶IRULQVWDQFHEHWZHHQDFKRLFHRIGULQNV.RRO$LGRUFRIIHH7KHUHOHYDQW
VHPDQWLFNQRZOHGJHDERXWWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQDGXOWV¶DQGFKLOGUHQ¶VEHYHUDJH
preferences is likely to be firmly possessed by young children, and so engaging the episodic 
system may only muddy the waters. In the case of our own question (who will be more happy 
or more sad), the relevant knowledge (e.g., that people can be happy about the fact that an 
experience is over, even though the experience itself may have made them sad) may simply 
QRW\HWEHDYDLODEOHVHPDQWLFDOO\DVGLVFXVVHGDERYHWKRXJKLWPD\EHIDPLOLDULQFKLOGUHQ¶V
personal experience. Thus in the case of temporal preferences for hedonic goods, to the extent 
that children engage their episodic system, it may serve as a scaffold rather than a hindrance 
(at least in the case of negative experiences). In other words, if Bélanger et al. are correct in 
WKHLUVXJJHVWLRQWKDW\RXQJFKLOGUHQ¶VWKLQNLQJDERXWRWKHUV¶SDVWVRUIXWXUHVSULPDULO\
engages the semantic system, then the 4-5-year-olds who completed our task may have 
lacked the relevant knowledge WRUHDVRQDSSURSULDWHO\DERXWRWKHUV¶SDVWRUIXWXUH-directed 
emotions.  
These considerations introduce the issue of exactly what types of processes 
XQGHUSLQQHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶MXGJPHQWVDERXWWKHLURZQSUHIHUHQFHV2QHSRVVLELOLW\VWHPPLQJ
from existing research on temporal asymmetries in judgments, is that there is an affective 
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basis for such judgments (Caruso et al., 2008; Suhler & Callender, 2012). In Experiment 1, 
although participants of all ages were asked to make emotional predictions about other people 
based on the temporal location of experiences, they were not actually asked to predict how 
they themselves would feel if an experience was in the past versus the future, or how they felt 
now when thinking about the past or future experience. Thus, although for older children and 
adults, judgments about others¶ emotions showed the same temporal patterns as judgments 
DERXWWKHLURZQSUHIHUHQFHVZHKDYHQRGLUHFWHYLGHQFHZKHWKHUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDUH
informed or underpinned by predictions regarding their own emotional states or by current 
emotions.4 In their research on past-future asymmetries of value, Caruso et al. asked 
participants not only to place a value on a past or future event (e.g., 5 hours of boring data 
entry work) but also to make a judgment about how they felt when considering the past or 
future events. They found that past-future asymmetries in value judgments seemed to be 
mediated by asymmetries in emotion (though see Burns et al., 2019). Similarly, future studies 
could specifically examine the role of affect or affective prediction in temporal preference 
judgments by asking participants questions about emotions alongside temporal preference 
questions for the same experiences.  
In Experiment ZHH[DPLQHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SUHGLFWLRQVRIRWKHUV¶WHPSRUDO
preferences rather than emotional states, and found children from aged 7-8 upwards and 
adults judged that someone else would have the same pattern of temporal preferences as 
themselves. The only GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQMXGJPHQWVUHJDUGLQJRQH¶VRZQDQGRWKHUV¶
preference that was in evidence was in Experiment 3, where, compared to their own case, 
children predicted that another person would be somewhat quicker to trade off a temporal 
preference for a smaller amount of pain. It is not clear why this might be, although some 
 
4 Indeed, it can be seen from the last column in Table 1 that even adults are not always consistent when making 
MXGJPHQWVDERXWRWKHUV¶HPRWLRQVDQGDERut their own preferences. However, the task design was such that 
participants were never making these two types of judgments about the same experiences.  
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philosophers have argued that past-future hedonic preferences may be less in evidence when 
adopting a third-person perspective on events, because this leads to a degree of emotional 
distancing from experiences (Dougherty, 2015; Greene & Sullivan, 2015). Greene et al. 
(2020) also reported that temporal preferences were less strong when considering a third-
person perspective.  
In Experiment 3, in which there was some evidence of a perspective effect in children, 
participants were always required to weigh unequal amounts of pain and pleasure in the past 
and future. When thinking about another person, children may have been more likely to focus 
simply on the numerical difference between (e.g.) 2 versus 4 painful injections, rather than 
the emotional significance of injections being in the past versus the future. +RZHYHUDGXOWV¶
predictions regarding others¶ preferences did not differ in any respect from their own 
preferences, and when judgments involved equal amounts of past or future pain/pleasure 
(Experiment 2), all groups of participants showed equally strong temporal preferences for 
another person as for themselves. Our results showed that even 7-8-year-olds seem to assume 
that past-future hedonic preferences are ubiquitous; given this, it is perhaps not surprising that 
SKLORVRSKHUVKDYHDVVXPHGWKDWVXFKSUHIHUHQFHVDUHD³EUXWHIDFW´DERXWKXPDQSV\FKROogy 
(Hare, 2013). How can we reconcile this with *UHHQHHWDO¶VILQGLQJWKDWWKHVWUHQJWK
of temporal preferences is affected by perspective? We note that there is an important 
difference between the question that participants were asked in our procedure, and the form 
of questioning used in that of Greene et al (2020). We asked participants to make predictions 
DERXWDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VSUHIHUHQFHVZKHUHDV*UHHQHHWDODVNHGSDUWLFLSDQWVZKDWWKH\
themselves would prefer to be the case for another person. Thus, our task specifically 
examined whether adults and children assumed that others would have clear temporal 
preferences, whereas, arguably, Greene et al.¶VWDVNIRFXVHGRQZKDWWKHSDUWLFLSDQWWKRXJKW
might be best for another person.  
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8. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the studies reported here provide new evidence about the ways in 
which time influences SHRSOH¶Vdecisions and preferences. That past-future hedonic 
preferences emerge very early in development (at least as far as unpleasant experiences are 
concerned) provides additional confirmation of a general future bias in human cognition that 
has been of growing interest to psychologists working across a number of different traditions 
(Boyer, 2008; Burns et al., 2019; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007). However, such a future bias is not absolute: people are concerned about their past as 
well as their future. Our preferences are not neutral with respect to whether hedonic 
experiences in our lives have already passed or are yet to come, but nor do they appear to be 
firmly fixed. 
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